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Abstract
We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing—a
menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach exploits duality methods to identify conditions on the distribution of consumer types
under which (a) each product is purchased by the same set of buyers as under separate
monopoly pricing (though the transfers can be different), and (b) these sets are nested.
We exhibit two distinct sets of sufficient conditions. The first set of conditions weakens the monotonicity requirement of types and virtual values but maintains a regularity
assumption, i.e., that the product-by-product revenue curves are single-peaked. The
second set of conditions establishes the optimality of upgrade pricing for type spaces
with monotone marginal rates of substitution (MRS)—the relative preference ratios for
any two products are monotone across types. The monotone MRS condition allows us
to relax the earlier regularity assumption.
Under both sets of conditions, we fully characterize the product bundles and prices
that form the optimal upgrade pricing menu. Finally, we show that, if the consumer’s
types are monotone, the seller can equivalently post a vector of single-item prices:
upgrade pricing and separate pricing are equivalent.
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1
1.1

Introduction
Motivation and Results

Pricing multiple goods with market power is a canonical problem in the theory of mechanism
design. It is also a challenge of growing importance and complexity for online retailers and
service providers, such as Amazon and Netflix. Both in theory and in practice, designing
the optimal mixed bundling mechanism, (i.e., pricing every subset of products) becomes
exceedingly complex in the presence of a large number of goods.
A natural question is then whether simpler pricing schemes are optimal under suitable demand conditions. A simple, commonly used mechanism consists of upgrade pricing, whereby
the available options are ranked by set inclusion, i.e., some goods are only available as addons, Ellison (2005). For example, many online streaming services use a tiered subscription
model, whereby users can pay to upgrade to a “premium package”—a subscription with a
larger selection of the provider’s content relative to the “basic package”, Philips (2017).
In this paper, we obtain sufficient conditions under which upgrade pricing maximizes
the seller’s revenue. Our approach consists of first identifying conditions under which the
consumer’s types can be ordered in terms of their absolute or relative willingness to pay for
the seller’s goods, and then ranking the goods themselves by the profitability of selling them
to larger sets of consumer types. Our sufficient conditions not only establish the optimality
of some upgrade pricing menu: they also show that the optimal bundles are deterministic,
and they reveal the order in which they are ranked in the menu. That is, we identify all the
nested bundles that appear in the seller’s menu, and the profit-maximizing price for each
one.
Our results consist of two distinct sets of conditions. The first set of conditions (Theorem
1) illustrates the essence upgrade pricing optimality in what we label as “regular” settings.
While these conditions are reminiscent of regularity in one dimension, they are in fact weaker
than the monotonicity of the buyer’s multidimensional types and of the (item by item)
Myersonian virtual values. What we require is for the consumer’s types to be ranked in
such a way that the virtual values for each item are negative over an initial and positive
over a final segment. Furthermore, we require any consumer with a positive virtual value
for an item to also have a larger value for that item, relative to any type with a negative
virtual value. At the optimal prices, the lowest type buying each good is indifferent between
buying it and not buying it. Finally, the sets of types buying each item are nested under the
weak monotonicity property, which implies the optimal allocation can be implemented via
upgrade pricing.
The second set of conditions (Theorem 2) describes our best attempt at extending our
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approach to non-regular distribution of types. In order to further weaken the regularity
requirement, we restrict attention to type spaces for which the relative preference ratios for
any two goods are monotone across types. An example of ordered relative preferences is if
higher types have a stronger preference for good 2 over good 1. We refer to such a condition
as “monotone marginal rates of substitution” (monotone MRS).
The intuition for our two results can be grasped by considering the demand functions
for each good separately. Under monotonicity and monotone MRS, the optimal monopoly
prices for each of the goods are ranked. In the special case where the Myersonian virtual
values for our ordered types
φki = θik −


1 − Fi k
θi+1 − θik
fi

are also monotone for each item k, the first set of conditions applies.
When virtual values are not monotone, however, they can cross zero more than once.
In that case, the result still holds, but the proof requires the right ironing procedure. Our
ironing procedure relaxes the standard approach of Myerson (1981) and the literature up
to Haghpanah and Hartline (2020). Specifically, we do not iron with the goal of monotone virtual values, which corresponds to a concave revenue curve. Rather we iron towards
single-crossing virtual values which leads to a quasiconcave revenue curve. We then use the
structure implied by monotone MRS to derive a dual certificate of optimality.
Under either set of conditions, each good is purchased by the same set of buyers that
would buy it if that were the seller’s only product. We further show (Theorem 3) that, if
the consumer’s types are (not weakly) monotone, the seller can equivalently post the vector
of single-item monopoly prices—i.e., bundling is redundant. For example, in the case of two
goods sold separately, monotone type spaces mean that no consumer type will buy good
2 without also buying good 1. More generally, the seller benefits from restricting the set
of bundles the consumer can purchase through a proper menu of options with the upgrade
property. However, examples also show that implementability through separate pricing is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the optimality of upgrade pricing.

1.2

Related Literature

First and foremost, our paper contributes to the economics literature on product bundling.
The profitability of mixed bundling relative to separate pricing was first examined by Adams
and Yellen (1976), and further generalized by McAfee et al. (1989). More recently, a number
of contributions have studied the optimal selling mechanisms in the case of two or three
goods, and derived conditions for the optimality of pure bundling (see, for example, Manelli
3

and Vincent (2006) and Pavlov (2011)). Daskalakis et al. (2017) use duality methods to characterize the solution of the multiproduct monopolist’s problem, and show how the optimal
mechanism may involve a continuum of lotteries over items. Bikhchandani and Mishra (2020)
derive conditions under which the optimal mechanism is deterministic when the buyer’s utility is not necessarily additive. Finally, Ghili (2021) establishes conditions for the optimality
of pure bundling when buyers’ values are interdependent. Relative to all these papers, we
focus on a specific class of simple mechanisms, which includes pure bundling as a special
case.
Hart and Nisan (2017) and Babaioff et al. (2014) also study the properties of simpler
schemes. The former derives a lower bound on the revenue obtained from separate item
pricing. The latter obtains an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal mechanism,
relative to the better of pure bundling and separate pricing.
In the context of nonlinear pricing, Wilson (1993) suggested a “demand profile” approach
that determines the price of each incremental unit by treating it as separate market. This
approach is particularly attractive in settings where there is a natural ordering over the
items. This in particular is the case when there is a homogeneous good that is offered in
various quantities, such as in energy markets for electricity or water. This approach naturally
generates a sequence of upgrade prices. The demand profile approach, and in particular
the incremental pricing rule implied by it, does not always yield an optimal mechanism
as consumers may wish to obtain earlier units in order to obtain the later units. Thus, a
contribution of the current paper is to determine when upgrade pricing is exactly optimal
and then to find the upgrade prices as solutions to the global revenue maximization problem
rather than the incremental item problem. Other papers make assumptions that make sure
that a demand profile-type approach yields an optimal mechanism. In Johnson and Myatt
(2003), buyers have unit demand and sellers offer different varieties of a single good. The
approach in their paper is to assume a quality ranking on the varieties and to solve for the
upgrade prices—the additional payments required to buy a better variety. The survey of the
nonlinear pricing literature by Armstrong (2016) covers related approaches that optimize
upgrades separately.
Our formulation of the dual problem follows Cai et al. (2016), who present a general duality approach to Bayesian mechanism design. Cai et al. (2016) formulate virtual valuations in
terms of dual variables, state the weak and the strong duality results, and use them to establish lower bounds for relative performance of simple mechanisms. An important contribution
by Haghpanah and Hartline (2020) exploits the duality machinery to provide sufficient conditions for the exact optimality of a specific, simple mechanism—pure bundling—consisting
of offering a maximal bundle at a posted price. Under their sufficient conditions, the dual
4

variables can be recovered from a single-dimensional problem in which the seller is restricted
to bundle all items together.
We follow the approach of Haghpanah and Hartline (2020) by leveraging the duality
approach to provide sufficient conditions for the optimality of a particular class of mechanisms. Haghpanah and Hartline (2020) gave a characterization of the optimality of the
grand bundle, we provide a characterization for upgrade pricing. As upgrade pricing allows
multiple bundles to be present in the menu, we cannot assign the dual variables by solving a
one-dimensional problem. Instead, we develop a novel ironing algorithm that generates these
variables by ironing different item’s revenue curves for different types. Under our sufficient
conditions, the so-constructed virtual surplus is maximized by an element-wise monotone
allocation that can be implemented by upgrade pricing; by complementary slackness, this
certifies the optimality of upgrade pricing. Because pure bundling is one instance of upgrade
pricing, our conditions differ from those of Haghpanah and Hartline (2020).
Our ironing differs from existing ironing approaches using duality and tackles a more
general problem. In comparison to Haghpanah and Hartline (2020), we prove optimality
for mechanisms with menu size surpassing two. Fiat et al. (2016) studies a two-parameter
model, and uses an ironing approach that leads from the revenue curves to their concave
closure. Devanur et al. (2020) generalizes Fiat et al. (2016) to more general orders on the
second parameter. Our approach tackles optimality for an arbitrary finite number of items
and varies the ironing procedure. On a technical level, our ironing procedure yields quasiconcave ironed revenue curves, whereas the ironed revenue curves in Haghpanah and Hartline
(2020); Fiat et al. (2016); Devanur et al. (2020) are concave.
Our results also feed into a literature specifying optimal finite mechanisms for multidimensional types. (Daskalakis et al., 2017, section 7) for example characterizes the optimal
mechanisms for the two-good monopolist problem if the optimal mechanism has a particular
structure. While Daskalakis et al. (2017) requires that the region of the type space that is
not allocated any item is not adjacent to all regions getting specific constant allocations,
upgrade pricing mechanisms consistently break this requirement.

1.3

Structure of the Paper

The model is introduced in section 2. The first set of sufficient condition is presented in
section 3. In section 4, we present our results for monotone MRS type spaces. In section 5,
we discuss the relationship between separate pricing and upgrade pricing. We conclude in
section 6.

5

2

Model

We consider a standard multiple-good monopoly setting. There is a single seller of d ≥ 1
goods and a single buyer. The seller’s marginal costs of production are normalized to zero.
The buyer’s utility function is additive across goods. We refer to the vector of marginal utilities θi ∈ Rd as the buyer’s type. Therefore, the utility of buyer type θi from the consumption
vector q ∈ [0, 1]d is given by
d
X
U (θi , q) =
θik q k .
k=1

Pd
k k
We also adopt the shorthand notation hθi , qi :=
k=1 θi q . As a convention, we denote
types by subscripts and items by superscripts. The buyer’s utility is quasi-linear in transfers
and her outside option is also normalized to zero.
The buyer knows her type. From the seller’s perspective, the buyer’s type is distributed
over a finite set Θ ⊆ Rd+ , with |Θ| = n, according to the distribution f ∈ ∆(Θ). For any
positive integer n, we adopt the convention that [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}, and we index types by
P
i ∈ [n]. We let fi := f (θi ) and denote the cumulative distribution sequence by Fi = ij=1 fj ,
i ∈ [n].
The seller aims to maximize revenue. By the revelation principle, we can focus on direct
mechanisms (q, t) = (qi , ti )i∈{0}∪[n] . These mechanisms can be interpreted as menus with
n + 1 items so that item i delivers consumption vector qi at price ti and item (q0 , t0 ) := (0, 0)
captures the buyer’s outside option.
We call a menu upgrade pricing if {q0 , q1 , . . . , qn } can be ordered in the component-wise
partial order on Rd given by q ≤ q 0 ⇔ ∀k ∈ [d] : q k ≤ (q 0 )k . Our main goal is to provide
conditions under which upgrade pricing maximizes the seller’s revenue among all direct
mechanisms.

3

Optimal Mechanisms for Regular Distributions

We will make prominent use of the (partial) Lagrangian duality-based certificate of optimality
used by Cai et al. (2016). We state the underlying duality result to fix notation.

6

3.1

Duality

In what follows, we will associate with λji the Lagrange multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint of type θj deviating to type θi , j ∈ [n], i ∈ {0} ∪ [n]:
hqj , θj i − tj ≥ hqi , θj i − ti .
We note that the incentive constraints corresponding to λj0 , j ∈ [n] are type j’s individual
rationality constraints. As a main tool in our analysis, we define the multi-dimensional
virtual values associated with Lagrange multipliers λ ∈ Rn × Rn+1 as
φλi

n
1 X
:= θi −
λji (θj − θi ).
fi j=1

(1)

Lemma 1. A mechanism (qi , ti )i∈{0}∪[n] maximizes revenue if and only if there exist multipliers λji , j ∈ [n], i ∈ {0} ∪ [n] such that
1. λji ≥ 0 (Non-Negativity)
2. (qi )i∈[n] optimizes max(qi )i∈[n] ∈[0,1]n
3. fi =

Pn

j=0 λij −

Pn

j=1

Pn

i=1

fi hqi · φλi i (Virtual Welfare Maximization)

λji for all i ∈ [n] (Feasibility of Flow)

4. λji (hqj , θj i−tj −hqi , θj i−ti ) = 0 for all j ∈ [n], i ∈ {0}∪[n] (Complementary Slackness)
5. There are transfers t such that (q, t) is incentive compatible and individually rational
(Implementability)
We call the dual variables λji , j ∈ [n], i ∈ [n] ∪ {0} flows from type j to type i whenever
they are non-negative and satisfy Lemma 1 item 3. This name is inspired by flow conservation
constraints from the maximum flow and minimum cost flow problem in discrete mathematics
(Korte and Vygen, 2011).
Proof of Lemma 1. Slater’s condition for affine inequality constraints (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 227) allows us to write revenue maximization subject to the incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints as an unconstrained optimization problem for (qi , ti )i∈[n] subject to complementary slackness and non-negativity of dual variables.
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The Lagrangian reads:
L=

=

n
X

fi ti +

n X
n
X

i=1

j=1 i=0

n
X

n
X

fi −

ti

i=1

=

λji (hqj , θj i − tj − hqi , θj i − ti )

λij +

j=0

n X
n
X

=

+

n X
n
X

λji hqj , θj i −

j=1 i=0

n X
n
X

λji hqi , θj i

j=1 i=0

λji hqi , θj i

j=1 i=0
n
X

j=1

i=1

j=1

λji

j=1

λji hqj , θj i −

n
X

n
X

!

n X
n
X

j=1 i=0

=

n
X

λij −

fj hqj , θj i −

n
X

!
λji hqj , θj i −

i=0

n
X

!
λji (hqi , θj i − hqj , θj i)

i=0

n
X

!
λji (hqi , θj i − hqj , θj i)

=

i=0

n
X

fj hqj , φj i.

j=1

Clearly, it is necessary for an optimal mechanism to be implementable. To conclude the proof,
we need to show that virtual welfare maximization and feasibility of flow are equivalent to
maximizing the Lagrangian. Assume virtual welfare maximization and feasibility of flow.
Then the above equalities show that the Lagrangian is maximized and certify the optimality
of the mechanism (qi , ti )i∈[n] . Conversely, assume that the Lagrangian is maximized by
(qi , ti )i∈[n] . If the flow λji were not feasible, then choosing ti arbitrarily large or small would
lead to a higher value for the Lagrangian, which yields a contradiction. Given that this is
zero, the Lagrangian equals virtual welfare, and virtual welfare maximization follows from
optimality.

3.2

A Sufficient Condition for Regular Distributions

Our first set of sufficient conditions for upgrade pricing optimality consists of a weak monotonicity condition and a regularity condition.
We call a type distribution F weakly monotone with cutoffs i1 , i2 , . . . , id ∈ [n] if for any
i, j ∈ [n] and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
i ≤ ik ≤ j =⇒ θik ≤ θjk .
Note that weak monotonicity is strictly weaker than monotonicity: for each item, only order
comparisons with respect to a cutoff type need to hold, whereas types above or below the
cutoff can be arbitrarily ordered.
Similarly, a type distribution F is regular with respect to cutoffs i1 , i2 , . . . , id ∈ [n] if for

8

any i, j ∈ [n] and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
i ≤ ik ≤ j =⇒ φki ≤ 0 ≤ φkj ,

(2)

where φi denotes the initial d-dimensional virtual values
φi := θi −

1 − Fi
(θi+1 − θi ).
fi

(3)

The initial d-dimensional virtual values can be seen as multi-dimensional versions of the
virtual values in Myerson (1981).
We say that a type distribution F is compatibly weakly monotone and regular if it is both
weakly monotone and regular with respect to the same set of cutoffs. When such cutoffs ik
exist, they are essentially unique except between contiguous types of vanishing virtual value
φki and monotone types θik , i ∈ [n], k ∈ [d]. Subfigure 1a illustrates a type distribution with
this property.
Our regularity condition can be equivalently stated in terms of the pseudo-revenues
Rik := (1 − Fi−1 )θik .

(4)

Subfigure 1c depicts pseudo-revenues. We call (4) pseudo-revenue because, without an assumption that the values are monotone with respect to the component-wise partial order,
the pseudo-revenue does not correspond to the revenue from sales of item k at a posted price
of θik . In particular, because we have
k
k
(1 − Fi−1 )θik − (1 − Fi )θi+1
Rik − Ri+1
=
fi
fi
k
− θik )
fi θik − (1 − Fi )(θi+1
1 − Fi k
=
= θik −
(θi+1 − θik ) = φki , (5)
fi
fi

imposing regularity with respect to the cutoffs ik is equivalent to requiring that Rik is singlepeaked with peak ik . While pseudo-revenues do not have immediate economic meaning, they
are an important technical tool, in particular for our analysis of non-regular distributions in
section 4.
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Theorem 1. If the type distribution F is compatibly weakly monotone and regular with
respect to cutoffs (ik )k∈[d] , then upgrade pricing is optimal. In particular, the following mechanism is optimal:

1 i ≥ i k
qik :=
,
0 else.

θ2i

i ∈ [n], k ∈ [d].

Rik

ϕ2i

2.0

4

θ3

0.8

ϕ3
3

1.5

0.6

θ2

2

1.0

θ4
0.5

(6)

ϕ2

θ1

-0.4
0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.2

-0.2

ϕ1

θ1i

ϕ4

1

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

ϕ1i

-1

0.2

R1
1.5

(b) Virtual values

(a) Types

R2

0.4

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

i

(c) Pseudo-revenues

Figure 1:
Types, virtual values and pseudo-revenues for type space Θ =
9
27
1
{( /128, /64), ( /4, 3/2), (1/2, 2), (1, 1)} and type distribution f = (7/16, 3/16, 1/8, 1/4). The optimal mechanism sells good 2 at a price of 1 and good 1 as an upgrade, also at a price of 1.
All types except θ1 buy good 2, and only type θ4 buys good 1.
Proof. Define the dual variables

λ̂ji =


1 − F

i

0

if j = i + 1

(7)

else.

Observe that, by definition, λ̂ induces the initial virtual values, φi = φλ̂i .
We check the properties of Lemma 1. Virtual welfare maximization, condition 2, follows
from
(5)
(6)
k
qik = 1 ⇐
⇒ Rik ≥ Ri+1
⇐
⇒ φki ≥ 0.
For flow preservation, condition 3, observe that
n
X
j=1

λ̂ij −

n
X

λ̂ji = 1 − Fi−1 − (1 − Fi ) = fi .

j=0

The mechanism is implementable, condition 5, by assumption of compatible weak monotonicity and regularity.
Finally, we need to check that complementary slackness (condition 4) holds. Observe
10

that λ̂ij > 0 implies j = i − 1. Hence, all types must be indifferent between their allocation
and payment and the allocation and payment of the next lower type. If the next lower type
has the same allocation and payment, this is clearly satisfied. Otherwise, this is the first
type buying an upgrade. If this type were not indifferent between buying it and not buying
it, the price of the upgrade could be raised, and the revenue increased, without affecting
other types’ incentives. Thus, this type must be indifferent between their allocation (and
payment) and the next lower type’s allocation.
Our assumptions of regularity and weak monotonicity relax the monotonicity of types
and Myersonian virtual values by allowing for permutations above and below the monopoly
price. These assumptions nonetheless require that the set of types that buy each object
remains an upper selection, and conversely the set of types that do not buy remains a lower
selection. The intuition for why this works is similar to the idea that the monopoly price
does not depend on the valuations of types that are not marginally buying, just as long as
they do not become marginal buyers.
These assumptions depend on the fixed order of types we have introduced in the model.
Thus, if there exists an order that satisfies these assumptions, upgrade pricing is optimal.
Furthermore, multiple orders of types might satisfy the theorem’s conditions for a given type
distribution F . In this case, the theorem can be used to certify optimality of mechanism (6),
based on the different orders. As optimality of a mechanism for a distribution F does not
depend on the order on types, the revenue of (6) must be the same for all orders with which
the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
Our next set of conditions imposes similar requirements, strengthened appropriately to
allow for non-regular type distributions, which require ironing.

4

Optimal Mechanisms for Non-Regular Distributions

We now establish the optimality of an upgrade pricing mechanism in settings without regularity. The weaker sufficient conditions will replace the regularity condition and will allow for
ironing to be part of the optimal mechanism. The new sufficient conditions will serve to allow
us to perform the ironing procedure item-by-item, and limit the interaction of constraints
across items. We say that a type space Θ has monotone marginal rates of substitution if
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ d =⇒
for any i, j ∈ [n], l, k ∈ [d].
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θjl
θil
≤
.
θik
θjk

Recall that pseudo-revenue is given by Rik = (1 − Fi )θik .
We call a scalar sequence (Ri )i∈[n] , quasi-concave if there is a cutoff i0 ∈ [n] such that i0 ≤
i ≤ j or j ≤ i ≤ i0 implies Ri ≥ Rj . We call the point-wise smallest quasi-concave sequence
that point-wise dominates (Ri )i∈[n] its quasi-concave closure and denote it by (Ri )i∈[n] .
θ2i

Rik

5

1.2

θ4

R2

1.0

4

0.8

3

θ3

0.6

R1

2
0.4

θ2

1

0.2

θ1
0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

θ1i

(a) Types

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

i

(b) Pseudo-revenues

Figure 2:
Type space and pseudo-revenues for type space Θ
=
57
5
9
3
1
1
1
{( /64, 1), (1, /4), (2, 3), ( /4, 5)} and type distribution f = ( /8, /4, /8, /4). The optimal mechanism sells good 1 at a price of 57/64, and good 2 as an upgrade at a price of 5. All
types buy good 1, and only type θ4 buys good 2.
k

We will make regular use of the sequence (Ri )i∈[n] , the quasi-concave closure of the
pseudo-revenue for item k.
To allow for our construction of a dual certificate of optimality, we need additional assumptions. These will be formulated in terms of candidate ironing intervals. For a pseudorevenue R, we call a set of contiguous types I ⊆ [n] with
k

Ri 6= Rik

(8)

for all i ∈ I such that there is no superset of contiguous types I 0 ⊇ I such that (8) holds for
all i ∈ I 0 , a candidate ironing interval for item k. (With slight abuse of language, we refer
to discrete sets of contiguous types as intervals.) Every item k may have several candidate
ironing intervals, and every type can be contained in a candidate ironing interval for different
items.
We relax the regularity assumption on pseudo-revenues Rik . Instead of assuming regularity, i.e. Rik to be single-peaked with peak ik , we assume two properties that are in
combination weaker than regularity. We call a type distribution F mostly regular if for some
cutoffs ik ∈ arg maxi∈[n] Rik and any i such that ik < i ≤ ik+1 , the following hold:
1. (No partial overlap) If I is a candidate ironing interval of item k and J is a candidate
ironing interval of item k + 1, then either I ∩ J = ∅ and there is i ∈ [n] such that
I < i < J or J < i < I, or one of I, J is a subset of the other excluding its endpoints.
12

2. (No ironing on neighboring maxima) For any ironing candidate interval I of item k,
ik , ik+1 ∈
/ I.
3. (Not too shuffled) For any candidate ironing interval I ⊆ {ik + 1, ik + 2, . . . , ik+1 − 1}
and i ∈ I,
k+1
k+1
θmin
I ≤ θi

k
k
θmax
I ≤ θmax I+1

Finally, we call a distribution compatibly weakly monotone and mostly regular if it is weakly
monotone and mostly regular with respect to the same cutoffs ik , k ∈ [d].
Note that monotone MRS by itself is not a restrictive assumption. For example, in two
dimensions, every type set can be ordered in order of monotone MRS. In combination with
compatible weak monotonicity and mostly regularity, this assumption becomes stronger.
Subfigure 2a shows the type space of a compatibly weakly monotone and mostly regular
type distribution, and subfigure 2b its pseudo-revenues.
Conversely, Figure 3 shows an instance of a distribution over a monotone MRS type space
that is not mostly regular. In particular, this example fails the first condition, because it
involves overlapping candidate ironing intervals. We will use our assumptions to construct
Rik

θ2i

2.5

10

θ5
8

2.0

6

1.5
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Figure 3: Failure of no overlap: {2, 3} is a candidate ironing interval for item 2, {3, 4} is a
candidate ironing interval for item 1.
dual variables (λij )i,j∈[n] by ironing pseudo-revenues for each item. In our proof that there
is an optimal mechanism with an upgrade pricing allocation, we will use monotone MRS to
show that for each type, ironing is only needed for two items, the lowest item in the MRS
order that the type bought, and the highest item in the MRS order that she didn’t buy. We
will use the first two conditions of mostly regularity to show that from these two items, we
can select a single item to iron at a time, while not changing the other item’s virtual values in
a way that will break virtual welfare maximization of the allocation. As in Theorem 1, weak
monotonicity ensures implementability of an upgrade pricing allocation, i.e., the existence of
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a price vector (ti )i∈[n] such that the mechanism (q, t) is incentive compatible and individually
rational. To allow for our ironing procedure to work, we also need a mild requirement
on the monotonicity of types beyond weak monotonicity. While weak monotonicity was a
requirement that could be formulated item-by-item, this requirement links the type order of
neighboring items.
Theorem 2. Let Θ have monotone marginal rates of substitution. If the type distribution
F is compatibly weakly monotone and mostly regular with respect to cutoffs (ik )k∈[d] , then
upgrade pricing is optimal. In particular, the following mechanism is optimal:

1 i ≥ i k
qik :=
0 else,

i ∈ [n], k ∈ [d].

(9)

Note that the allocation (9) is the allocation that arises from separate monopoly pricing.1
To prove Theorem 2, we will construct a sequence of flows λi from i = n down to i = 1,
starting with λ̂, the initial flow that induces Myersonian multi-dimensional virtual values.
Given a definition of pseudo-revenue implied by a flow, our Ironing Algorithm will, for each
type i and for at least one item k, iron to match induced pseudo-revenue with the quasik
concave closure of multi-dimensional Myersonian pseudo-revenue, Ri . This is illustrated in
Figure 4.
The main steps in this proof are to show that the ironing is well-defined in that such
implied pseudo-revenue is attainable with a non-negative and feasible flow (Lemma 6 and
Lemma 4, respectively). The most technical part of the proof consists of showing that the
Ironing Algorithm produces dual variables that maximize virtual welfare (Lemma 3 and
Lemma 7 (a)), and satisfy complementary slackness (Lemma 7 (b)).
Our first lemma is a main structural tool to link different items’ virtual values and is
tightly connected to monotone MRS. For k ∈ [d], i ∈ [n], and flow λ, denote the normalized
virtual value by
φk,λ
νiλ,k := ik .
θi
The property that we will use repeatedly is that νiλ,k has the same sign as φλ,k
i . We call a
flow downward if λji > 0 for i, j ∈ [n] implies that j > i.
Lemma 2. Let Θ have monotone MRS. For any non-negative downward flow λ, νiλ,k ≥ νiλ,l
for any 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ d and i ∈ [n].
1

In section 5, we further explore the relationship between upgrade pricing and separate pricing, by showing
conditions under which the allocation (9) can be implemented by a vector of single-item prices.
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Proof. It follows from definitions and monotone marginal rates of substitution that
1
fi

Pn

n
n
1 X θjk
1 X
λji −
λji k
=1+
fi j=i
fi j=i
θi
P
n
n
θil − f1i nj=1 λji (θjl − θil )
1 X θjl
φλ,l
1 X
i
λji −
λji l =
=
.
≥1+
fi j=i
fi j=i
θi
θil
θil

θik −
φλ,k
i
=
θik

k
j=1 λji (θj
θik

− θik )

The next Lemma shows that virtual welfare maximization reduces to virtual welfare
maximization for the neighboring items, i.e., the last item that a type buys and the first
item that a type does not buy—with respect to the MRS order.
Lemma 3. Assume Θ has monotone MRS and mostly regular and that there exists a non≥0
negative downward flow λ such that for any i ∈ [n] such that ik ≤ i ≤ ik+1 , we have φλ,k
i
and φλ,k+1
≤ 0. Then, the allocation in (9) maximizes virtual welfare.
i
Proof. Fix i ∈ [n] such that ik ≤ i ≤ ik+1 . Note that as φλ,k
and νiλ,k are positive multiples
i
of each other, Lemma 2 implies the implications
φλ,k+1
≤ 0 =⇒ φλ,l
i
i ≤ 0,
φλ,k
i

≥ 0 =⇒

φλ,l
i

≥ 0,

l ≥k+1
l < k.

λ,l
Therefore, the assumption implies that φλ,l
i ≤ 0 for any l > k and φi ≥ 0 for any l ≤ k,
which ensures virtual welfare maximization of (9).

For k = 0 and k = d this Lemma reduces virtual welfare maximization for all items, and
ironing for all items, to virtual welfare maximization for the first resp. last item. Finding a
flow that maximizes virtual welfare reduces to ironing the (one-dimensional) virtual values φ1i
and φdi . For types i ≤ i1 and i ≥ id , we can hence use techniques from one-dimensional ironing
and iron the pseudo-revenue to its concave closure in a discrete variant of Myerson (1981)’s
procedure. From now, our discussion therefore focuses on k ∈ [d − 1] and i ∈ [ik + 1, ik+1 ],
i.e. types where an ironing that ensures virtual welfare maximization for both item k and
item k + 1 is needed.
The following algorithm will make use of λ̂ as defined in (7), the initial flow and of a
generalization of the pseudo-revenue. The pseudo-revenue associated to a flow λ, Riλ,k is
Riλ,k

=

n
X
j=i
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fj φλ,k
j .

This generalization is intuitive, as virtual values are, as in (5), slopes of pseudo-revenues
λ,k
Riλ,k − Ri+1
=
fi

Pn

j=i

Pn
λ,k
fj φλ,k
j −
j=i+1 fj φj
= φλ,k
i .
fi

(10)

Our algorithm will adjust a flow by raising one point in a revenue sequence at a time, from
right to left. We will prove that this will yield slopes of revenue sequences—i.e. virtual
values—which have the correct sign for virtual welfare maximization of (9). This is nontrivial, as pseudo-revenues for different items might not move in the same direction when
dual variables are changed.
λ ← λ̂;
for i = n to 1 do
Let γi ∈ [0, 1] be maximal such that for
λ0ji ← γi λji ,

∀j : n > j > i

λ0j(i−1) ← λj(i−1) + (1 − γi )λji , ∀j : n > j > i
n
X
0
λi(i−1) ← λi(i−1) − (1 − γi )
λi0 i ,

(11)

i0 =i
λ0 ,κ(i)

κ(i)

= Ri
Ri
λ ← λ0 ;

holds;

Return λ0 ;
Algorithm: Ironing, parameterized by an ironing mapping κ : [n] → [d]
The flow (11) was used earlier in Haghpanah and Hartline (2020). An important difference
is that Haghpanah and Hartline (2020) choose γi to iron the revenue sequence of the grand
bundle to the concave closure of pseudo-revenue. Instead, we iron to the quasi-concave
closure of (their equivalent of) pseudo-revenue of an item κ(i). The parameter γi can be
found as solution to a system of linear equations. We show that a solution γi ∈ [0, 1] exists
in Lemma 6.
We first observe that the Ironing Algorithm outputs a flow which is non-negative and
feasible.
Lemma 4. The output of the Ironing Algorithm is a flow, i.e. non-negative and satisfies
flow preservation, Lemma 1 item 3.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction from i = n to i = 1. Note that λ̂ is feasible as argued
in the proof of Theorem 1, which starts the induction. Fix an arbitrary iteration i ∈ [n],
and assume that λ is feasible. We check that the difference in excess flow, i.e. incoming and
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outgoing flow, cancel out for j > i. For i and i + 1 similar calculations yield the result. We
omit these. For any j > i,
λ0ji − λji + λ0j(i−1) − λj(i−1) = γλji − λji + λj(i−1) + (1 − γi )λji − λj(i−1) = 0.
Now consider non-negativity. Each λij reduces at most once during the course of the Ironing
Algorithm. More specifically, only if j = i − 1 and during iteration i. In this iteration,
λ0i(i−1) = λi(i−1) − (1 − γi )

n
X

λi0 i ≥ λi(i−1) −

i0 =i

n
X

λi0 i = fi ≥ 0,

i0 =i

where we used that γi ≤ 1, λir = λ̂ir , r < i − 1, which in particular implies that λir = 0, and
feasibility of the flow.
Next observe that in the Ironing Algorithm, iteration i changes the revenue (for any item
k) only for type i. Hence, our ironing algorithm raises pseudo-revenue for one type at a time.

0

0

Lemma 5. For any iteration i, Rjλ ,k = Rjλ,k for any j 6= i. In particular, φλj ,k = φλ,k
for
j
j∈
/ {i − 1, i}.
Proof. First note that as the in-flow for higher types remains unchanged in iteration i,
0
λ0rj = λrj , r ∈ [n], j > i, the revenue does not change, Rjλ ,k = Rjλ,k . For types j < i, we
check that the changes to virtual welfare on the types whose inflows do change, i and i − 1,
cancel out. By definition of virtual values,
n
1 − γi X
k
λji (θjk − θi−1
)
fi j=i

0

+
φλi ,k = φλ,k
i
0

,k
φλi−1
= φλ,k
i−1 +

= φλ,k
−
i

n
n
1 − γi X
1 − γi X
k
k
λji (θjk − θi−1
)−
λji (θjk − θi−1
)
fi−1 j=i
fi−1 j=i
n
1 − γi X
k
).
λji (θjk − θi−1
fi j=i

Hence,
0

0

,k
λ,k
fi−1 φλi−1
+ fi φλi ,k = fi−1 φλ,k
i−1 + fi φi .

The statement on the virtual values follows from (10).
Before showing that γi in the algorithm always exists, we define the ironing function κ(i).
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By no ironing on neighboring maxima, each candidate ironing interval I must be contained in an interval {ik , ik +1, . . . , ik+1 }. By this condition, in addition to no partial overlap,
for each type i, there is a unique inclusion maximal candidate among the candidate ironing
intervals for items k and k +1. We let κ(i) denote the item this interval is a candidate ironing
interval for. If i is not part of any ironing interval, we set κ(i) arbitrarily in {k, k + 1}. We
call κ(i) the ironed item for type i and piece-wise constant intervals of κ ironing intervals.
λ (γi ),κ(i)

Lemma 6. Assume that F is mostly regular. Then, for each i ∈ [n], γi such that Ri i
κ(i)
Ri exists. In particular, the Ironing Algorithm is well-defined.

=

Proof. We prove this statement by induction from i = n down to 1. Let i ∈ [n] and assume
λ,κ(i)
λ,κ(i)
that Ri+1 = Ri+1 . If i is not part of an ironing interval, then by definition of ironing
λ,k
intervals and Lemma 5, Riλ,k = Ri , and the induction step is trivial by choosing γi = 1,
λ0 (1),k
λ0 (1),k
= Ri
yielding Ri
. Otherwise, i is in an ironing interval. Let κ(i) = k. By no
partial overlap, if i + 1 is part of an ironing interval, it must be part of the same ironing
interval, in particular must have been ironed for item k. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
λ,k
λ,k
= Ri+1 .
Ri+1
Denote
k
k
Ri − Ri+1
k
φi =
fi
the slope of the quasi-concave closure of pseudo-revenue of item k at type i. By definition
of the quasi-concave closure, the slope of the revenue curve must be non-positive,
k

φi ≤ 0.
As all types are non-negative, we get that
λ0 (0),k

φki ≤ 0 ≤ θik = φi
λ0 (0),k

k

Again by Lemma 5, Ri+1 = Ri+1

.

(12)

. Therefore

k

λ0 (0),k

k

Ri = fi φki + Ri+1 = fi φki + Ri+1
λ0 (0),k

≤ fi φi
k

λ0 (0),k

+ Ri+1

λ (0),k

λ (0),k

= Ri i

.

In particular, Ri ≤ Ri i
.
k
λ0 (1),k
Also, by Lemma 5 and the definition of the quasi-concave closure, Ri
= Riλ,k ≤ Ri .
λ0 (γ),k
As γ 7→ Ri
is a continuous function, the existence of the desired γ ∈ [0, 1] follows from
the Intermediate Value Theorem.
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Figure 4: Ironing of virtual values and corresponding pseudo-revenues.
The last lemma before the proof of Theorem 2 shows that the output of the algorithm
satisfies complementary slackness and the condition of Lemma 3, which is sufficient for virtual
welfare maximization.
Lemma 7. Assume that Θ is has monotone MRS, and that F is mostly regular. Then, q
maximizes virtual welfare and satisfies the requirements of Lemma 3 with respect to λ0 , the
output of the Ironing Algorithm.
Proof. We first show that λ0 satisfies the requirements of Lemma 7, i.e. that for any ik ≤ i ≤
ik+1 we have that φλ,k
≥ 0 and φik+1,λ ≤ 0. Let i ∈ [n]. If i is not in an ironing interval, and
i
there is no ironing interval I such that i = min I − 1, the claim follows from the definition
of the quasi-concave closure and our definition of ironing intervals, as well as Lemma 5.
We consider the remaining cases i = max I, i = min I − 1, and i ∈ I \ {max I} separately.
For the third case, by definition of the ironing and the quasi-concave closure,
λ0 ,κ(i)

φi

λ0 ,κ(i)

= νi

= 0.

For κ(i) = k, νik+1,λ ≤ 0 by Lemma 2 and hence φk+1,λ
≤ 0 as νik+1,λ and φk+1,λ
are positive
i
i
k,λ
multiples of each other. Similarly, we have for κ(i) = k + 1 that νi ≥ 0 by Lemma 2 and
hence φk,λ
≥ 0. It remains to consider i = min I − 1 and i = max I. We consider these
i
separately for κ(i) = k and κ(i) = k + 1, for a total of four cases.
k
Case 1. i = max I and κ(i) = k. By definition of the quasi-concave closure, Ri = Rik ,
0
the algorithm chooses γi = 1 and hence φλi ,k = φki = 0 and hence by arguments as above,
0
φλi ,k+1 = φk+1
≤ 0.
i
Case 2. i = min I − 1 and κ(i) = k + 1. By definition of the quasi-concave closure,
k+1
Ri = Rik+1 , the algorithm chooses γi = 1 and hence, by an argument similar to case 1,
φλ,k
= φki ≥ 0.
i
Case 3. i = max I and κ(i) = k + 1.
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The derivative of the virtual value of the right end of the ironing interval, type i is given
by
0
n
∂φλi ,k
1 X
1
k
=−
λji (θjk − θik ) = − λ(i+1)i (θi+1
− θik ).
∂γ
fi j=i+1
fi

(13)

By no partial overlap, 0 ≤ φki . Also, by not too shuffledness, (13) is non-positive. Hence,
0
γ 0 (0),k
φki = φi
≤ φλi ,k , and the algorithm chooses γi < 1. Combining these observations, we
0
obtain φk,λ
≥ 0.
i
Because the algorithm chooses γi < 1, this implies
0

φλi ,k ≥ φki ≥ 0.
Case 4. i = min I − 1 and κ(i) = k. The derivative of the virtual value of the next item
at the left end of the ironing interval, type i is given by
0
n
n
1 X
1 X
∂φiλ ,k+1
k+1
k+1
k+1
=
λji (θj − θi ) −
λji (θi+1
− θik+1 )
∂γ
fi j=i+1
fi j=i+1

n
1 X
k+1
λji (θjk+1 − θi+1
) ≥ 0,
=
fi j=i+1

(14)

where the last inequality follows from not-too-shuffledness (note that i + 1 = min I). By no
0
γ 0 (0),k
≥ φλi ,k+1 because of (14) and because
partial overlap, 0 ≥ φk+1
. Moreover, φk+1
= φi
i
i
the algorithm chooses γi < 1. Combining these observations, we obtain φk+1,λ
≤ 0.
i
To show complementary slackness, observe that whenever i is not in an ironing interval,
κ(i)
κ(i)
as γi is chosen maximal such that Ri = Ri , the Algorithm chooses γi = 1, which implies
that for j > i > r and for j > i + 1 and i = r, λ0jr = 0. By no ironing over maxima,
this implies that for j > ik > r, λjr = 0. Moreover, as an invariant of the algorithm the
flow λ is downward. Hence, the only dual variables that are tight are within types that get
the same allocation and payment (corresponding to λij such that ik ≤ i, j ≤ ik+1 , k ∈ [d])
or local downward constraints (corresponding to λ(i+1)i , i ∈ [n − 1]). The former incentive
constraints clearly bind, the latter bind by weak monotonicity, as for the marginally buying
type (which, by compatibility of weak monotonicity with mostly regularity must also be the
first type in the MRS order), the price could be raised if she were not indifferent between
her allocation and payment and the allocation and payment of the next lower type.
Having this result, we are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 2.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Implementability follows from weak monotonicity and the definition of
the optimal mechanism, (9). Non-negativity and feasibility of flow are properties of the
Ironing Algorithm shown in Lemma 4. Virtual welfare maximization and complementary
slackness have been shown in Lemma 7.

5

Upgrade Pricing and Separate Pricing

In both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we established the optimality of an upgrade pricing
mechanism that yields the same allocation as separate (item by item) monopoly pricing,
though not necessarily the same transfers. We will show in this section that, under monotonicity with respect to the component-wise partial order, separate pricing and upgrades
become equivalent—upgrade pricing is redundant.
We say that the type space Θ is monotone if θik ≤ θjk for any i < j ∈ [n] and k ∈ [d].
We call a mechanism separate pricing if a type separately chooses whether to buy each
item k at a price pk . Formally, a mechanism satisfies separate pricing if it can be written as:

1 θ k ≥ p
k
i
k
qi =
0 else,

ti =

d
X

pk 1qik =1 .

k=1

Theorem 3. If the type space Θ is monotone, then the outcome of any upgrade pricing
mechanism can be implemented via separate pricing, and conversely. When the type space is
not monotone, neither implication needs to hold.
Proof. We first assume types are monotone and show that the allocation and revenue of any
upgrade pricing mechanism can be obtained through a separate pricing mechanism, and vice
versa.
Let θ1 ≤ · · · ≤ θi ≤ · · · ≤ θn , and fix an upgrade pricing mechanism M. This mechanism
admits an indirect representation as (a) a collection of bundles ranked by set inclusion
{bk }K
k=0 , with b0 = ∅ and K ≤ d, and (b) a vector of prices tk that are increasing in k,
with t0 = 0. Let θk and θ̄k denote the lowest and highest types who choose bundle bk under
mechanism M. Because types are monotone, buyer self-selection implies θk ≥ θ̄k−1 .
We now construct a separate pricing mechanism, i.e., a vector of prices {pj }dj=1 that
yields the same allocation and payments as our upgrade pricing mechanism. To do so, define
the collection of upgrades uk := bk \ bk−1 and the upgrade prices τk := tk − tk−1 . For each
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upgrade bundle k and every good j ∈ uk , let the single-item prices pj satisfy

 j
pj ∈ θ̄k−1
, θjk

and

X

pj = τk .

j∈uk

Under monotonicity, such a vector of prices always exists. By consumer self-selection in
the original mechanism M, we have
θ̄k−1 bk − tk ≤ θ̄k−1 bk−1 − tk−1 ,
θk bk−1 − tk−1 ≤ θk bk − tk .
In turn, this implies
θ̄k−1 uk ≤ τk ≤ θk uk .
With the prices so constructed, each type purchases the same goods as under M and
pays the same total price. Notice first that each type’s choice from the original mechanism
M is still available at the same price, i.e., each bundle bk can still be purchased for a total
price tk . Moreover, by monotonicity, no type θ who buys bundle bk under the upgrade pricing
mechanism M derives positive net surplus from any object j ∈ uk0 with k 0 > k under the
separate prices constructed above. And finally, no such type θ derives positive net surplus
by removing any object j ∈ uk0 with k 0 ≤ k from her consumption bundle.
The other direction of this result is immediate: if types are monotone, the goods purchased by two different types under any separate pricing mechanism are ranked by set inclusion. Thus, replacing the separate pricing mechanism with the resulting upgrade pricing
mechanism yields the same outcome.
Finally, we show by means of two counterexamples that, without type monotonicity,
separate pricing is not equivalent to upgrade pricing.
In particular, there exist type spaces and vectors of separate prices that do not induce
an upgrade pricing allocation. For example, let
Θ = {(1, 1), (1, 3), (3, 3), (4, 1)}
and consider the separate prices p = (2, 2): type θ2 buys good 2 only, type θ3 buys both
goods, and type θ4 buys good 1 only.
Likewise, for the same type space, consider the upgrade pricing mechanism where q =
(0, 1) is sold for t = 2 and q = (1, 1) is sold for t = 4, i.e., good j = 1 is only sold as an
upgrade, for an additional price τ = 2. Under this mechanism, type θ2 buys good 2 only,
while types θ3 and type θ4 buy both goods. However, as we saw above, the vector of separate
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prices p = (2, 2) yields a different allocation (and a lower revenue for the seller).
Whenever an upgrade pricing mechanism implements the allocation of optimal separate
pricing, each marginal type θk is indifferent by construction between the two consecutive
bundles bk−1 and bk . Theorem 3 then implies that the outcome of this mechanism can be
implemented by the separate monopoly prices.
Corollary 1. If Θ is monotone, q is an allocation of an optimal upgrade pricing mechanism, and q is the allocation of separate monopoly pricing, then separate monopoly pricing
is optimal.
Adding a monotonicity condition to both of our main theorems, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we hence obtain two sets of sufficient conditions under which separate monopoly
pricing is optimal.
Corollary 2. If Θ is monotone and F is regular, separate monopoly pricing is optimal.
Corollary 3. If Θ is monotone and has a monotone marginal rates of substitution, and F
is mostly regular, then separate monopoly pricing is optimal.

6

Conclusion

It is a common practice for a seller to offer bundles of products or services that are ordered
in a way that more expensive bundles contain all items from less expensive bundles as well as
some extra items. In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions under which such “upgrade
pricing” schemes are exactly optimal for a monopolist seller.
There are several ways in which the current analysis could be extended. First, our
conditions could be relaxed to account for richer type spaces and type distributions, such
as a continuum of types in the d-dimensional space. One natural extension can be obtained
immediately: assume that a type distribution can be split into several type cohorts, in fact
quantized type space, such that each type cohort satisfies the conditions of our theorems.
Our results imply that the optimal mechanisms in each respective cohort are upgrade pricing.
In this respect, Bergemann et al. (2021) show that in nonlinear pricing problems, the revenue
of the continuous type space is generally well approximated by a finite quantized type space.
Second, our sufficient conditions for the optimality of upgrade pricing may be complemented by necessary conditions. In doing so, one may want to distinguish between conditions
on type distributions and type spaces. For example, one may ask which type spaces guarantee
that upgrade pricing is optimal irrespective of the type distribution.
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Finally, throughout the paper we highlight the interplay between optimality of different
pricing schemes: bundling, upgrade pricing, and separate sales. It would be instructive to
provide a more complete characterization of the cases in which one of these schemes strictly
outperforms another.
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